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1 Introduction
While trade liberalization of past sixty years has brought great economic growth, recent
research suggests it may have harmed the environment.1 However, surely trade liberal-
ization in environmental goods and services, making cleaner technologies more widely
available especially in developing countries, must be good for the environment? This
was the thinking at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha (WTO, 2001),
where "with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment",
the conference agreed to negotiate on "the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of
tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to environmental goods and services". It instructed the
Committee on Trade and Environment to give particular attention to "those situations
in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benet
trade, the environment and development". This idea of a "win-win-win" solution is
also strongly promoted by the OECD (2003, 2005).
So far, the Doha round has produced the so-called Bali agreement of December
2013, which does not include environmental goods. Shortly after the Bali agreement,
representatives of many countries including the US, the EU, China and Japan, jointly
representing 86% of world trade in environmental goods, pledged their commitment to
work together and with other WTO Members to begin preparing for negotiations for
reducing tari¤s on environmental goods (USTR, 2014).
In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of trade liberalization in environmental goods
and services (EGS) on a countrys EGS sector,2 its welfare and its environmental
quality. Our analysis is especially relevant for developing countries where the demand
for EGS is fast expanding, while the domestic sector is still immature3 and trade
1Antweiler et al. (2001) nd that trade liberalization has generally reduced SO2 concentrations.
Cole and Elliott (2003) suggest it will reduce BOD, but increase CO2 and NOx emissions. Managi
et al. (2009) conclude that trade has beneted the environment in OECD countries, but increased
SO2 and CO2 emissions elsewhere. Lovely and Popp (2011) empirically examine two e¤ects of trade
openness: While it improves access to the latest clean technologies, it also reduces industrys ability
to pass on regulatory costs to consumers.
2See Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) for a description of the global eco-industry.
3OECD (2005) predicts that the EGS market will grow by less than 1% annually in developed
countries and by 8.6% in the developing countries, while Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) predicts growth
gures of 3-5% and 10-15% respectively. In 2003 nearly 80% of the global exports of EGS originated
in developed countries (Hamwey, 2005).
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barriers for EGS are relatively high (OECD, 2005; De Melo and Vijil, 2014).
We will model EGS as integrated technologies, reducing the emission-to-output ratio
of production.4 We consider an industry where the downstream goods production is
polluting and the upstream industry is engaged in R&D to develop a cleaner technology
which it can licence to the downstream rm. The upstream rm faces competition from
a foreign rm after trade liberalization.
We nd that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the incentive for domestic rm
to do R&D is ambiguous. Trade liberalization usually leads to the availability of
cleaner technologies and higher welfare. However, this increase in welfare comes at
the expense of the environment.5 The government responds to the opportunity for
cleaner production by allowing more production, to the point where total pollution
increases. Borrowing a term from the energy economics literature (Saunders, 2000),
the availability of a cleaner technology causes a backre e¤ect. Thus we cast doubt on
the "win-win-win" outcome that the WTO and OECD hope for: there seems to be a
"win" both for welfare and trade, but not for environmental quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant
literature. After describing the model in Section 3, we solve the game by backwards
induction. In Section 4 we analyze how the upstream rms set their technology fees
under di¤erent possible R&D outcomes. In Section 5, we look at government policy
under free trade and autarky. Section 6 discusses the R&D decisions of the rms. In
Section 7, we compare expected welfare and environmental damage under autarky and
free trade. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
The literature on innovation and adoption of new abatement technology, reviewed by
Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a), has mostly assumed that if a polluting rm
wants to install a new abatement technology, it has to pay a certain installation or
4The denition of EGS has been a major stumbling block in the WTO negotiations so far (Zhang,
2013; De Melo and Vijil, 2014).
5In a di¤erent context, with heterogeneous rms and an exogenously xed emission tax rate,
Bréchet and Ly (2013) also show that the adoption of cleaner technology can increase pollution.
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(possibly) R&D cost itself. Some authors take into account that one rm can license
its invention to other rms. In the papers by Milliman and Prince (1989), Biglaiser and
Horowitz (1995), Fischer et al. (2003), the innovator is one of the polluting rms. In
other papers, which we will discuss here, there are specialized rms (the eco-industry)
that licence their innovations or sell their products to the polluting industry.6
Parry (1995, 1998) sets up a model with free entry into the eco-industry. The
probability that a given rm will nd (and obtain a patent for) the new technology is
decreasing in the number of eco-rms. Parry (1995) argues that when the government
sets the emission tax rate before the eco-rmsentry decision, the tax rate will usually
be below marginal damage. Parry (1998) compares emission taxes, tradable emission
permits and relative standards, but only at their respective Pigouvian levels. This is
to counter monopoly pricing by the innovator, excessive entry into the eco-industry
and the excess of innovator revenue over social benets. In the same vein, David et al.
(2011) nd that although raising the emission tax rate induces new abatement suppliers
to enter the market, it might not increase abatement e¤orts. This is because with the
stringent tax, the demand for the abatement goods becomes more price inelastic leading
to eco-rms reducing their output.
La¤ont and Tirole (1996) argue that the monopolistic innovator will set a licence
fee that slightly undercuts the permit price set by the regulator. If the regulator sets
the permit price after R&D, she will set it equal to zero in order to obtain complete
di¤usion of the clean technology. As a result, the innovators licence fee income will be
zero, so that he will not invest in R&D. Although the timing of our game is similar to
La¤ont and Tiroles (1996), we do not encounter the problem of incomplete di¤usion,
because there is only one rm to which the innovators license their technology.
Requate (2005b) models a monopolistic eco-rms R&D and licensing fee decisions
for a number of timing and commitment regimes. Environmental policy (the tax rate
or the number of tradable permits issued) is either set after the downstream rms
adoption decisions, after observing R&D success but before adoption, or before R&D,
where it could be contingent on or independent of R&D success. The author nds that
6All papers discussed here assume welfare-maximizing governments. See Canton (2008) for a
political-economy model with the eco-industry in an international setting.
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commitment to a menu of tax rates dominates all other policy regimes. In our paper,
we only model environmental taxation set after observing R&D success but before
adoption. We expand Requates (2005b) model by including the downstream product
market and competition between a domestic and a foreign eco-rm.
Perino (2010) includes the output market for the downstream industry and nds
that optimal emissions, as well as emissions under tradable permits, can be decreasing
in the cost of abatement. We nd a similar result with a di¤erent model: Expected
pollution rises when international trade results in the availability of cleaner technology.
We now turn to the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. All the
papers we discuss here (unlike our own paper) model the eco-industrys product as an
end-of-pipe technology, equivalent to an input into production, in the sense that the
more the downstream rm uses of it, the lower its emissions. These papers usually
do not consider the eco-industrys R&D incentives. Our paper, on the other hand,
assumes that the eco-industry provides an integrated abatement technology (reducing
emissions per unit of output), which the downstream rm can either use (against a fee)
or not use, and we analyze the eco-industrys R&D incentives.
Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) consider an international Cournot duopoly with an
eco-rm in the home country. Unlike in our model, Feess and Muehlheusser (2002)
assume that the price of its product is exogenously given. The authors nd that if the
eco-rm benets from a higher tax rate, the home goverment will set a higher tax rate
than the foreign government. However, the home government may lower its tax rate
when there is learning by doing.
Greaker (2006) shows how a country can increase the export market share of its
(perfectly competitive) polluting industry by committing to a low level of allowed
emissions per rm. This is because the stricter environmental policy leads more rms
to pay the initial R&D cost to enter the eco-industry. This increased competition in
the eco-industry lowers the price of the environmental good.
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) employ a two-country model with an eco-rm in
each country, supplying the perfectly competitive polluting industries in both countries.
The authors nd that a more stringent environmental policy is good for the domestic
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polluting industry, because it reduces the price of abatement equipment. However,
the increase in demand from the domestic polluting industry may benet the foreign
eco-rm at the expense of the domestic eco-rm.
In a framework similar to Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) but with a monopolistic
Northern eco-rm, Nimubona (2012) shows that an import tari¤ on EGS helps the
Southern government extract rents from the eco-rm. An exogenous decrease in the
tari¤ leads to a lower emission tax in the South if the South cannot fully extract the
eco-rms rents. While EGS imports rise, the decrease in the tax rate results in higher
production, so that pollution may actually increase. Like Nimubona (2012), we nd
that trade liberalization usually increases the expected cleanliness of production, but
when it does, it also increases pollution. However, our model is quite di¤erent in that
we model EGS as an integrated technology rather than end-of-pipe, we assume there is
a Southern eco-rm that can undertake R&D, and we model trade liberalization as a
discrete jump from autarky to completely free trade rather than a marginal reduction
in the tari¤.
3 The model
We consider the market for a consumption good, for which domestic demand is given
by P = A   q, with P the product price, q production and A > 0. For simplicity, we
assume there is only one domestic producer of the good (the downstream rm),7 with
constant marginal cost of production c: We will normalize A  c = 1; so that:
P   c = 1  q (1)
For simplicity, we assume that there is no international trade in this good. Produc-
tion of the good is polluting. Environmental damage of emissions E is:
D (E) =
1
2
E2 (2)
The abatement technologies d; h; f; n that the downstream rm might use are inte-
grated technologies that result in a certain emissions-to-output ratio e = E=q. Tech-
7If there were multiple downstream rms, we would have to consider the upstream rmsincentives
to increase revenue by licencing to a limited number of rms at a higher fee.
6
nology d is the technology that the downstream rm itself has developed. We normalize
the emission-to-output ratio ed of this technology to one. The other technologies are
owned by the upstream rms. The downstream rm can use them for a at fee F .
The domestic (foreign) upstream rm has abatement technology h (f) available;
with ef < eh < 1; i.e. the foreign upstream rms technology is cleaner than the domes-
tic upstream rms, and both are cleaner than the downstream rms own technology.
We can interpret this as the downstream rm having made an imperfect imitation of
the upstream rmsabatement technologies (Parry, 1995, 1998).
Both upstream rms can do R&D into a new technology n with en < ef . Firm js
(j = h; f) cost of R&D is Cj; with:
Cf = Ch;   1 (3)
and its probability of nding the new technology is pj (ph  pf ). Thus the foreign
upstream rm has (weakly) lower cost of nding the new technology and is (weakly)
more likely to nd it.
Each technology consists of know-how and possibly also abatement equipment. The
equipment for technology i can only be built by the rm supplying the technology, at
cost Ki. We shall assume:8
Kh  Kf  Kn  0 (4)
The foreign upstream rm can also licence its technology i = f; n abroad, earning
net revenue (fees minus production costs) of Ri; with Rn > Rf > 0:We assume that the
domestic upstream rm does not have the expertise to licence its technology abroad.
Environmental policy consists of an emission tax. The domestic government sets
the tax rate t at the level that maximizes domestic welfare.
We compare the regimes of autarky and free trade. With autarky, tari¤ and/or
non-tari¤ barriers are so high that it is impossible or not protable for the foreign
upstream rm to o¤er its technology to the domestic downstream rm. With free
trade, there are no barriers for the foreign upstream rm. The game under autarky is
as follows:
8If Ki = 0; technology i is a blueprint that requires no equipment.
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1. The domestic upstream rm decides whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome
of R&D is observed.
2. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic upstream and downstream rms bargain over the fee for the up-
stream rms technology.
4. The domestic upstream rm builds the equipment. The downstream rm sets its
output level.
The game under free trade is:
1. The domestic and foreign upstream rms decide whether or not to do R&D, and
the outcome of R&D is observed.
2. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic and foreign upstream rms set their technology fees.
4. The downstream rm decides which abatement technology. The winning up-
stream rm builds the equipment. The downstream rm sets its output level.
We will solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two games.
4 Licence fee and output decisions
In this section, we will solve for stages 3 and 4 of the game, introducing some constraints
we will have to impose on the parameters.
Using backwards induction, we start the analysis in stage 4. For stages 2 to 4,
the superscript s denotes the di¤erent scenarios; according to the technologies that
are available. We will dene the scenarios at the end of this section. The subscript i
denotes the technology that the downstream rm uses. The downstream rms prot
gross of the licence fee (and its own building cost Kd if applicable) in scenario s with
technology i is, from (1):
si = (P   tei)qsi = (1  qsi   tei) qsi (5)
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Di¤erentiating (5) and solving for the prot-maximizing quantity qsi yields:
qsi =
1  tei
2
(6)
Substituting (6) into (5), we nd the gross prot of the downstream rm as:
si =

1  tei
2
2
= (qsi )
2 (7)
Moving on to stage 3, denote the upstream rm with the most (least) e¢ cient
technology e1 (e2) by rm 1 (2), i.e. e1  e2.9
In autarky, the domestic upstream rm is always rm 1 and the downstream rm
is rm 2. We model the game between the two rms to determine the fee F s as
Nash bargaining where the upstream rm has bargaining power ~ 2 (0; 1]: The outside
payo¤s are zero for the upstream rm and sd  Kd for the downstream rm. We shall
assume that the downstream rm has a positive outside payo¤, but it would prefer the
domestic upstream rms technology if the fee equalled the equipment building cost:
s1  K1 > sd  Kd > 0 (8)
The Nash bargaining problem is then:
max
F s
(F s  K1)~ (s1   F s   sd +Kd)1 ~
The rst order condition is:
~ (F s  K1)~ 1 (s1   F s   sd +Kd)1 ~ = (1  ~) (F s  K1)~ (s1   F s   sd +Kd)~
Solving for F s yields:
F s = ~(s1   sd +Kd) + (1  ~)K1 > K1 (9)
where the inequality follows from (8).
9In order to avoid complications with corner solutions, we wish to restrict our parameters such
that qs2 > 0: We derive the appropriate restrictions in Appendix A. Note that q
s
2 > 0 implies q
s
1 > 0;
since qs1  qs2 by (6) and e1  e2:
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With free trade, rms 1 and 2 are the upstream rms. They engage in price com-
petition to sell their technology to the downstream rm.10 In the Nash equilibrium,
rm 2s fee will exactly cover its production cost K2, while rm 1 charges a fee of:
F s = s1   s2 +K2  K1 (10)
with si ; i = 1; 2; given by (7). The inequality follows from (4) and (7) with e1  e2.
Strictly speaking, the downstream rm is then indi¤erent between the technologies
o¤ered by the two rms. We assume that the downstream rm will choose rm 1s
technology. This is because rm 1 could always charge slightly less than F s in (10) to
make the downstream rm prefer its technology.
The net prot s of the downstream rm (net of the licence fee for the e¢ cient
technology) is then, from (9) and (10):
s = s1   F s =  (s2  K2) + (1  )(s1  K1) (11)
with si ; i = 1; 2; given by (7) and  = ~ (1) for autarky (free trade).
Firm 1s net fee (net of production cost) is:
Rs  F s  K1 (12)
We show in Appendix B that the licence fee is rst increasing and then decreasing
in the quality of the superior technology: From (6), (7) and (10):
dF s
de1
=  tsqs1 +  [Es2   Es1]
dts
de1
(13)
An improvement in the best technology (a decrease in e1) has two e¤ects on the
licence fee. Firstly, for a given tax rate, it increases the prots the downstream rm can
obtain and thus raises the fee. This is the rst term on the RHS of (13). Secondly, the
tax rate changes, with the e¤ect on F s given by the second term on the RHS of (13),
where Es2 > E
s
1: Initially, the tax rate might increase as the technology gets better.
This would cause a further increase in the fee. However, eventually the tax rate will
10Price competition can be seen as the process that endogenizes bargaining power, resulting in
complete (no) bargaining power for rm 1 (2) vis-a-vis the downstream rm.
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start to decline, which has a negative e¤ect on the fee. Eventually, the second e¤ect
dominates as the tax rate and the fee decline to zero.
We restrict our analysis to a level of abatement technology such that the licence fee
is decreasing in e1:
dF s
de1
< 0 (14)
If instead dF s=de1 > 0; the upstream rm would realize that it could gain a higher
fee with a worse technology. This would give the rm an incentive to tinker with or
sabotage the technology, increasing its e1 and gaining a higher licence fee. We discuss
the conditions for (14) to hold in Appendix B.
Finally, let us dene the scenarios. In autarky, the scenarios are nd and hd when
the domestic upstream rm has and has not found the new technology n respectively.
In both scenarios, the downstream rm chooses to use the domestic upstream rms
technology. With free trade, the scenarios with their equilibrium outcomes are:
 fh : Neither the domestic nor the foreign rm has found the new technology.
Then the foreign rm will supply technology f to the downstream rm.
 nh : Only the foreign rm has found the new technology. The foreign rm will
supply n to the downstream rm.
 nf : Only the domestic rm has found the new technology. The domestic rm
will supply n to the downstream rm.
 nn : Both rms have found the new technology. They compete the fee down to
Kn. The domestic rm is indi¤erent between the two upstream rmso¤ers.
5 Government Policy
In stage two of the game, the goverment sets the emission tax rate that maximizes
domestic welfare W s in scenario s; given that the domestic rm uses the most e¢ cient
technology e1. Social welfare is the sum of the domestic upstream and downstream
rmsprots, consumer surplus and tax revenues, minus environmental damage (2):
W s = s + F sh +
1
2
[qs1]
2 + te1q
s
1  
1
2
 [e1q
s
1]
2   K1 (15)
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where  is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) when the domestic (foreign) upstream
rm supplies the abatement technology.
When e1 is high, the government will want to set a positive tax rate in order to
reduce pollution. When e1 is low, the government would like to set a negative tax rate
in order to correct for under-production by the monopolist downstream rm. In our
analysis, we will exclude from our analysis values of e1 so low that t becomes negative.
Indeed, as we have announced in Section 4, we will even exclude higher e1 values for
which t is positive, but the licence fee is increasing in e1:
With the emissions-to-output ratio given, welfare only depends on qs1 if the domestic
rm supplies the technology. In that case, the government can reach the rst best
with the single instrument of the emission tax. There would be no welfare gain from
using another instrument such as an output subsidy. If the foreign rm supplies the
technology, welfare depends on qs2 as well as on q
s
1 and the government would gain
from having another instrument (such as an output subsidy) available. However, since
output subsidies are less commonly applied in manufacturing industries, we shall limit
our analysis to the single instrument of an emission tax.
5.1 Autarky
Denote the domestic upstream rms technology in stage 3 by i; i = h; n: With e1 =
ei; 
id + F idh = 
id
i by (11). Substituting this, (6) and (7) into (15), social welfare in
scenario id is given by:
W id =

1  tei
2
2
+
1
2

1  tei
2
2
+ tei

1  tei
2

  1
2


ei

1  tei
2
2
 Ki (16)
Di¤erentiating and solving for tid yields:
tid =
e2i   1
ei (1 + e2i )
(17)
The tax rate is positive if and only if:
e2i > 1 (18)
Substituting (17) into (6), we nd the equilibrium output level qidi and the output
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level qid0 that the downstream rm would choose using its own abatement technology:
qidi =
1
e2i + 1
; qidd =
e3i   e2i + ei + 1
2ei (e2i + 1)
(19)
Substituting this and (7) into (10), we obtain the technology fee as:
F idh = ~
 
1
e2i + 1
2
 

e3i   e2i + ei + 1
2ei (e2i + 1)
2
+Kd
!
+ (1  ~)K1 (20)
5.2 Free Trade
5.2.1 Domestic rm has found the new technology
In scenarios ng; g = f; n; the domestic upstream rm supplies the technology.11 Sub-
stituting e1 = en; e2 = ek and ng + F
ng
h = 
ng
n by (11), along with (6) and (7) into
(15), social welfare in scenario ng is:
W ng =

1  ten
2
2
+
1
2

1  ten
2
2
+ ten

1  ten
2

  1
2


en

1  ten
2
2
 Kn (21)
Di¤erentiating and solving for tng yields:
tnf = tnn =
e2n   1
en (e2n + 1)
(22)
Substituting this into (6), we obtain the equilibrium outputs as:
qnfn = q
nn
n =
1
e2n + 1
(23)
For scenario nf; substituting (22) into (6), we nd the equilibrium output of the
downstream rm when it uses the less e¢ cient technology f :
qnff =
e3n   efe2n + en + ef
2en (e2n + 1)
(24)
Substituting (7), (23) and (24) into (10), the domestic eco-rms licence fee is:
F nfh =

1
e2n + 1
2
 

e3n   efe2n + en + ef
2en (e2n + 1)
2
+Kf (25)
For scenario nn; we have F nnh = Kn.
11In fact, in scenario nn, the upstream rms compete the fee down to Kn and the downstream rm
as well as the government are indi¤erent between the two suppliers. For expositional simplicity, we
let the domestic rm supply the technology.
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5.2.2 Domestic rm has not found the new technology
In scenarios jh; j = f; n, the foreign rm supplies the technology to the downstream
rm. Substituting e1 = ej; e2 = eh; F
jh
h = 0 and 
jh = jhh (by (11)) along with (6)
and (7) into (15), social welfare in scenario jh is:
W jh =

1  teh
2
2
+
1
2

1  tej
2
2
+ tej

1  tej
2

  1
2


ej

1  tej
2
2
(26)
Di¤erentiating and solving for tjh yields:
tjh =
e3j + ej   2eh
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
(27)
The denominator on the RHS is positive, because it is the second order condition
for welfare maximization. Thus tjh > 0 holds in the welfare optimum if and only if:
e3j + ej   2eh > 0 (28)
Substituting (27) into (6), we obtain the equilibrium output level qjhj and the output
level qjhh with the less e¢ cient techonology h:
qjhj =
e2j + ejeh   e2h
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
; qjhh =
ej
 
3ej   eh + e3j   e2jeh

2
 
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
 (29)
Substituting this and (7) into (10), we nd the foreign rms technology fee:
F jhf =

e2j + ejeh   e2h
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
2
 
"
ej
 
3ej   eh + e3j  e2jeh

2
 
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
 #2 +Kh (30)
6 R&D decisions
In this section we solve for stage one of the game under autarky (subsection 6.1) and
free trade (subsection 6.2) and we compare the domestic rms R&D incentives under
both regimes (subsection 6.3).
6.1 Autarky
In autarky, the domestic rm will undertake R&D if its expected payo¤ from under-
taking R&D exceeds its payo¤ from not doing R&D:
phRndh + (1  ph)Rhdh   Ch > Rhdh
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Table 1: Payo¤ matrix for the domestic and foreign rmsR and D decisions
Home/Foreign R&D No R&D
R&D ph
 
1  pfRnfh  Ch; phRnfh  Ch; 
1  ph (1  pf )Rfhf +Rf+  1  ph pf  Rnhf +Rn Cf  1  ph Rfhf +Rf
No R&D 0; pf
 
Rnhf +Rn

+
 
1  pf Rfhf +Rf Cf 0; Rfhf +Rf
Note: Rs given by (12); F nfh given by (25); F
fh
f ; F
nh
f given by (30) with j = f; n:
with Rs given by (12) and F idh ; i = n; h; given by (20). Thus the rm will do R&D if
and only if:12
Ch < ChA  ph
 
Rndh  Rhdh

(31)
6.2 Free trade
Table 1 shows the payo¤ matrix for the domestic and foreign upstream rms in stage
one, depending on either rms decision whether or not to do R&D. The rst (second)
term in each cell shows the payo¤ to the domestic (foreign) rm.
Let us rst look at the foreign rms incentive to do R&D. In case the domestic
rm does R&D, the foreign rm will undertake R&D when:
Cf < Cf2 
 
1  ph pf Rnhf +Rn  Rfhf  Rf (32)
In case the domestic rm does not do R&D, the foreign rm will do R&D when:
Cf < Cf1  pf

Rnhf +Rn  Rfhf  Rf

(33)
It is easily seen from (32) and (33) that when the domestic rm does R&D, the
critical R&D cost level for the foreign rm is lower:
Cf2 < C
f
1 (34)
The reason for this is that without domestic R&D, the foreign rm can always
increase its net revenues from Rfhf + Rf to R
nh
f + Rn if it nds the new technology.
With domestic R&D, the foreign rm can only make this increase if the domestic rm
12ChA in (31), C
f
2 in (32), C
f
1 in (33), C
h
2 in (35) and C
h
1 in (36) are all positive by (14) and Rn > Rf .
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does not nd the new technology. In case the domestic rm nds the new technology,
the foreign rm does not earn any revenues, whether it is successful itself (then the fee
is competed down to Kn) or not (then the domestic rms technology is better).
Now we turn to the domestic upstream rms incentive to do R&D. If the foreign
rm does R&D, the domestic rm will undertake R&D when Ch < Ch2 or from (3):
Cf < Ch2 ; C
h
2  ph
 
1  pfRnfh (35)
In case the foreign rm does not do R&D, the domestic rm undertakes R&D for
Ch < Ch1 or from (3):
Cf < Ch1 ; C
h
1  phRnfh (36)
It is easily seen from (35) and (36) that for the domestic rm as well, its critical
R&D cost level is lower if the rival rm does R&D:
Ch2 < C
h
1 (37)
The reason is analogous to the reason behind inequality (34).
There will be an (R&D, No R&D) equilibrium if Cf2 < C
f < Ch1 and a (No
R&D, R&D) equilibrium if Ch2 < C
f < Cf1 : In order to avoid the indeterminacy and
complication of multiple equilibria, we have to assume either Cf2 > C
h
1 or C
h
2 > C
f
1 :
We shall assume the former, because the conditions for it to hold are less stringent:
 
1  ph pf Rnhf +Rn  Rfhf  Rf > phRnfh (38)
This inequality requires relatively few extra constraints, because pf  ph;   1
and Rn > Rf : On the other hand, it is ambiguous whether Rnhf   Rfhf is larger or
smaller than Rnfh :
From (34), (37) and (38), we then have the following inequalities:
Ch2 < C
h
1 < C
f
2 < C
f
1
The Nash equilibrium is then (R&D, R&D) if Cf < Ch2 ; (No R&D, R&D) if
Ch2 < C
f < Cf1 ; and (No R&D, No R&D) if C
f > Cf1 :
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6.3 Domestic rms R&D incentive
The domestic rm will do R&D in autarky if and only if Ch < ChA in (31) and with
free trade if and only if Ch < Ch2 in (35): We see that free trade gives the domestic
rm a larger incentive to invest in R&D if and only if:13
(1  pf )Rnfh > Rndh  Rhdh (39)
The inequality is more likely to hold for:
 Low ~: By (12) and (20), the lower the domestic upstream rms bargaining
power ~ vis-a-vis the downstream rm in autarky, the lower its fees and the
lower the increase in its fee from nding the new technology in autarky.
 Low eh; because Rhdh is decreasing in eh by (12) and (14): The better the domestic
rms existing technology, the higher the fee it will obtain for eh in autarky and
therefore the lower the R&D incentive under autarky.
 Low pf : The lower pf ; the higher the probability that the foreign rm fails to
nd the new technology, allowing the domestic rm to earn positive net revenue
from the new technology (if it nds it) under free trade.
 High ef ; because by (12) and (25), Rnfh is increasing in ef : The worse the foreign
rms existing technology, the higher the licence fee the domestic rm can obtain
if it nds the new technology and the foreign rm does not, and therefore the
higher the domestic rms R&D incentive under free trade.
Not only can ChA be above or below C
h
2 ; it can also be above or below C
f
1 =; with
Cf1 given by (33) and  by (3): This means that any combination of the two possible
outcomes under autarky and the three outcomes under free trade can arise.
13Trade liberalization which opens up the domestic market to the foreign upstream rm, always
increases the foreign rms R&D incentive, because its net revenue from licensing to the domestic
downstream rm is higher (or at least equally high) with the new technology.
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7 Comparing autarky and free trade
In this section, we compare the autarky and free trade equilibria with respect to ex-
pected welfare and expected environmental damage. For welfare, we nd:14
Proposition 1 Expected welfare is higher with free trade than in autarky for any com-
bination of equilibria, except when the domestic upstream rm undertakes R&D in
autarky and:
1. neither rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected welfare is
higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream rms success proba-
bility ph of R&D satises:
ph <
W fh  W hd + Ch
W nd  W hd (40)
2. only the foreign rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected
welfare is higher with free trade if:
Enh > End (41)
We see that the domestic country is better o¤with free trade in almost all equilibria
where trade liberalization makes cleaner technologies available (or raises the probabil-
ity of acquiring cleaner technologies). This is true even though the fee for using these
cleaner technogies may well have to be paid to the foreign upstream rm. The rea-
son is that the fee equals the domestic downstream rms change in prots, which is
su¢ ciently close to the change in welfare for the whole economy.
Turning to environmental damage, we nd:
14The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are in Appendix C.
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Proposition 2 Expected environmental damage is higher with free trade than in au-
tarky for any combination of equilibria, except when the domestic upstream rm un-
dertakes R&D in autarky and:
1. neither rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected environmental
damage is higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream rms success
probability ph of R&D satises:
ph <
(Efh)2    Ehd2
(End)2   (Ehd)2 (42)
2. only the foreign rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected
welfare is higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream rms cost
Ch of R&D satises:
Ch > ph(W nd  W nh)  (1  pf )(W fh  W hd)  (pf   ph)(W nh  W hd) (43)
Paradoxically, in almost all equilibria where trade liberalization leads to a cleaner
technology becoming available (or raises the probability of acquiring cleaner technolo-
gies), expected environmental damage is unambiguously higher under free trade. This
is because the government takes this opportunity of cleaner production to increase wel-
fare at the expense of the environment by reducing the e¤ective tax rate te1 on output,
prompting the rm to produce more and ultimately even to pollute more.
The result is similar to the rebound (Khazzoom, 1980) and backre e¤ects (Saun-
ders, 2000) in energy economics, where the introduction of a more energy-e¢ cient
technology (e.g. a more economical car engine) leads to an increase in demand which
partly (rebound) or more than completely (backre) o¤sets the potential energy saving.
Empirically, the rebound e¤ect is generally between 5 and 50% (Binswanger, 2001), but
Hanley et al. (2009) nd that an energy e¢ ciency improvement in Scotland ultimately
backres. In the same vein, Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2010) predict that a takeo¤ of
the science and technology sector in China will result in cleaner technologies becoming
available, but it will increase energy use and CO2 emissions because of an increase in
overall production and a shift to more energy-intensive sectors.
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Our model could be said to demonstrate a political backre e¤ect, because the
availability of a cleaner technology triggers a change in environmental policy, ultimately
resulting in more pollution.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the e¤ects of trade liberalization in environmental goods
and services (EGS) on a countrys domestic eco-rm, on welfare and on pollution.
Whereas other papers on this subject have assumed that the abatement technology
is end-of-pipe, we assume integrated technologies that reduce the emissions-to-output
ratio of production.
We have seen that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the domestic eco-rms R&D
incentive is ambiguous. The R&D incentive increases with trade if the domestic rms
existing technology is relatively clean, its bargaining power in autarky is low (so that
its R&D incentive under autarky is low), the foreign eco-rms existing technology is
not too clean and its probability of nding the new technology is low (so that the
domestic rms R&D incentive with trade is high). If the domestic rm does R&D
under autarky but not with trade, liberalization may decrease welfare. Thus it may
be best for a developing country to rst liberalize trade in environmental goods with
similar countries whose environmental technologies are not too much better than its
own. This will stimulate R&D by its domestic eco-industry, increasing welfare and
putting the sector in a better position to face competition from more advanced eco-
rms at a later date.
We further see that, although trade liberalization means that cleaner technologies
become available, it generally leads to an increase in pollution. This is because the
government takes the opportunity to increase welfare by reducing the e¤ective tax on
polluting output, boosting the downstream rms prots and consumer surplus while
increasing pollution. While the WTO argues that trade liberalization in EGS will
benet the environment as well as the consumer, our model sees the consumers benet
at the expense of the environment. This casts doubt on one of the main motivations
for trade liberalization in EGS.
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If the eco-industry invented a technology that was much cleaner than the existing
technologies, pollution would decline. However, the eco-industry does not have any
incentive to undertake R&D into a very clean technology, or even to market it if it is
available. This is because when a very clean technology is available, pollution is not a
pressing problem anymore and the government will set a negative environmental tax
rate to stimulate production. Then the eco-industry would not be able to make any
money from its invention.
The problem of negative tax rates is particularly severe in our model, because we
have assumed for simplicity that there is just one polluting rm which would like to
produce much less than the welfare-maximizing amount. If the industry were more
competitive, there would be less need for negative taxes and more incentive for R&D
into cleaner technologies. However, for very clean technologies, the tax rate and the
licence fee would still be decreasing in the cleanliness of the technology, discouraging
R&D into such cleaner technologies.
We nd that welfare usually increases with trade liberalization and generally changes
in the same direction as pollution. If trade liberalization increases pollution as well
as welfare, one might argue that the increase in pollution is nothing to worry about,
because environmental damage is just an element of social welfare, which is increasing
overall. However, particularly in developing countries, governments might not value
the environment enough and the increase in pollution might reduce welfare, especially
in the longer run.
Finally, let us reect on the signicance of our assumptions on policy timing, tari¤
revenues and environmental policy instruments.
We have assumed that the domestic government cannot commit to its environmental
policy before the eco-rms make their innovation decision. While one may question
whether governments, especially of developing countries, can commit to a policy that
is not ex post optimal, let us here explore the commitment scenario. If the government
could only commit to a single tax rate, regardless of the eco-rmsR&D decisions
and success, welfare would be lower than in the no-commitment scenario if the rms
undertake R&D and the new technology is much cleaner than the existing ones. If
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the government could commit to di¤erent tax rates depending on which technologies
are available, it would always be able to replicate the no-commitment policies and
outcome. The only improvement that commitment can make is on the eco-rmsR&D
decision. The government can now adjust the emission tax rate to increase the rms
R&D incentive. It will only nd this worthwhile if R&D costs are just below the level
where the eco-rms would do R&D in the no-commitment scenario. For relatively
low and relatively high R&D costs however, the government would not adjust the
no-commitment policy, and our analysis carries over to the commitment scenario.
We have assumed that pre-liberalization, tari¤and/or non-tari¤barriers are so high
that the foreign eco-rm will not o¤er its technology on the domestic market. However,
it could also be possible that the foreign rm is o¤ering its technology in spite of these
barriers, and that the domestic government earns tari¤ revenue from this. The tari¤
then allows the domestic government to capture some of the foreign eco-rms rents
and may be an important source of government revenue. Indeed, developing countries
are concerned about the loss of tari¤ revenue from liberalizing trade in environmental
goods and services (UNEP, ITC and ICTSD, 2012). We will leave the issue of tari¤
revenue for future research.
We have assumed that environmental policy consists of an emission tax. How-
ever, environmental policy around the world mainly consists of direct regulation or
command-and-control. The e¤ects of a relative standard, imposing a maximum emission-
to-output ratio, are straightforward. The downstream rm will only be interested in
technologies that meet the standard, selecting from these the technology with the low-
est equipment cost. An absolute standard, limiting emissions to a certain xed amount,
requires more analysis. We will also leave this for future research.
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A Appendix A: Conditions for qs2 > 0
Autarky. qidd in (19) is decreasing in  and has an interior minimum in ei 2
h
1=
p
; 1
i
given . To make sure that qidd > 0 for all ei 2
h
1=
p
; 1
i
; we calculate the  where
the minimum equals zero. Setting qidd = 0 and dq
id
d =dei = 0 in (19) yields, respectively:
e3i   e2i + ei + 1
ei(e2i + 1)
= 0
 2e4i + 4e2i + 1 = 0
The only positive solution for  and ei is  = 52
p
5 + 11
2
: Therefore qidd > 0 for all
ei 2
h
1=
p
; 1
i
if and only if:
 <
5
2
p
5 +
11
2
 11:09 (A1)
Free trade. Comparing (19) and (24), we see that qnff > q
nd
d by (18). Thus, condition
(A1) that ensures qndd > 0 is also su¢ cient for q
nf
f > 0:
Output qjhh ; j = f; n; in (29) is positive for all values of ej for which the second order
condition holds (which implies that the denominator on the RHS of (29) is positive) if
and only if:
lim
ej#e^j
ej
 
3ej   eh + e3j  e2jeh

2
 
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
 = +1 (A2)
where e^j as a function of eh and  is implicitly dened by:
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h = 0 (A3)
The point where the LHS of (A2) switches from +1 to  1 is where
3ej   eh + e3j  e2jeh = 0 (A4)
and (A3) holds. Solving (A3) and (A4) simultaneously for  and ej; we nd that the
only positive real solution features  = 1
2e2h
 
3
p
5 + 5

: Then qjhh > 0 for all ej if and
only if:
 <
3
p
5 + 5
2e2h
t
5:8541
e2h
(A5)
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B Appendix B: The licence fee
In Section 4, we introduced the restriction that the licence fee should be decreasing in
e1: In this appendix, we discuss the conditions under which this is the case.15
Figure 1. The domestic rms licence fee F idh under autarky for ~ = 1
when the domestic rm has technology ei; i = h; n:
B.1 Autarky
Figure 1 shows the licence fee F idh (given by (20)) as a function of ei for di¤erent values
of  with ~ = 1. The condition dF idh =dei < 0 is binding for i = n; because it is clear
from Figure 1 that when dF ndh =den < 0; then dF
hd
h =deh < 0 as well, since eh > en.
Thus en should exceed en; where en is dened implicitly by:
dF ndh (en)=den = 0 (B1)
B.2 Free trade
Domestic rm has found the new technology. Comparing dF nfh =den in (25) to dF
nd
h =den
in (20) with i = n; we see that qualitatively the only di¤erence lies in the less e¢ cient
technology 2 which has ef < 1 in scenario nf and e = 1 in nd: At en as dened by
(B1) we must have dtnd=den > 0 by (13). Then since emissions with the less e¢ cient
technology E2 are lower in scenario nf than in nd; dF
nf
h (en)=den < 0 and dF
nf
h =den = 0
occurs at an en < en.
Domestic rm has not found the new technology. It can be shown that F jhf in
(30); j = n; f; is rst increasing and then decreasing in ej: Then the condition dF
jh
f =dej <
0 is binding for j = n; since when dF nhf =den < 0; then dF
fh
h =def < 0 as well, since
ef > en. Thus en should exceed ~en; where ~en is dened implicitly by:
dF nhf (~en; eh)=den = 0 (B2)
It can be shown that ~en(eh) is an increasing function of eh.
15Further details are available from the corresponding author upon request.
24
Table 2: Minimum values of en from (11)
 [en; ~en(en)] [~en (e
max
h ) ; e
max
h ]
3 [0:708; 0:779] [0:807; 1]
5 [0:570; 0:644] [0:673; 1]
7 [0:485; 0:551] [0:565; 0:914]
9 [0:426; 0:483] [0:498; 0:807]
11 [0:383; 0:432] [0:451; 0:730]
Note: en dened by (B1), ~en by (B2).
B.3 Conclusion
We have found two minimum values of en: en in (B1) does not depend on eh; while ~en
in (B2) is increasing in eh: This means that for low values of eh; the binding constraint
is en > en; while for higher values of eh it is en > ~en: Table 2 shows how the minimum
en value changes with eh for selected values of : With  = 3; for instance, en = 0:708
while ~en = 0:708 for eh = 0:779: Thus for 0:708 < eh < 0:779; the binding constraint is
en > en = 0:708: For eh > 0:779; the binding constraint is en > ~en; with ~en increasing
in eh: For the maximum value of one for eh; ~en = 0:807: For the  values of 3 and 5,
the maximum value of eh is one, whereas for higher s it is constrained by (A5).
C Appendix C: Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us rst collect the expressions for welfare. Substituting (17) and (19) into (16)
yields welfare in scenario id; i = h; n:
W id =
1
2 (e2i + 1)
 Ki (C1)
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21) gives welfare in scenarios nn and nf as:
W nn = W nf =
1
2 (e2n + 1)
 Kn (C2)
Substituting (27) and (29) into (26) gives welfare in scenario jh; j = f; n; as:
W jh =
e4j   2ehe3j + e2he2j + 5e2j   2ehej   e2h
4
 
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
  Kh (C3)
Before proving the Proposition, we rst establish the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 1 When the domestic rm has not found the new technology, welfare is higher
with free trade than under autarky: W jh > W hd with j = f; n:
Proof. From (C1) with i = h and (C3); it is clear that W hd = W jh for ej = eh:
From (C3):
dW jh
dej
=
 7eje2h + 2e3j + 3e2jeh   2e5j   2eje4h + 6e2je3h   2e3je2h + 2e6jeh   2e5je2h
2
 
3e2j   2e2h + e4j
2
(C4)
The sign of dW jh=dej in (C4) is the sign of the numerator on the RHS. Dening
a  ej=eh; b  e2j ; the sign of the numerator is the sign of:
 =  7a2 + 2a4 + 3a3   2ba4   2b+ 6ba  2ba2 + b2a3   b2a2 (C5)
 has a maximum in b for:
b = b  3a  a
3   a2   1
a2(1  a) (C6)
b is positive for a 2 (a; 1]; with a  0:414: For a 2 [0; a] ;  reaches its maximum
at b = 0, which from (C5) is clearly negative.
Substituting b = b from (C6) into (C5), we nd the maximum possible value of 
given a 2 (0:414; 1]:
 =
1  4a4 + 6a2   5a
a2
Plotting this expression shows that  < 0 for all a 2 (0:414; 1]. Thus  < 0 in
(C5) for all feasible values of a and b; which means that dW jh=dej < 0 in (C4). This
combined with W hd = W jh for ej = eh proves the lemma.
Lemma 2 In scenario nf with free trade, welfare W nf net of the domestic upstream
rms net revenue Rnfh exceeds welfareW
hd in scenario hd under autarky: W nf Rnfh >
W hd:
Proof. From (C2) and (25):
W nf  Rnfh =
1
2
e2n   1
(e2n + 1)
2 +
(e3n   efe2n + en + ef )2
4e2n (e
2
n + 1)
2  Kn (C7)
Di¤erentiating (C7) with respect to en, we obtain:
d

W nf  Rnfh

den
=


2e3n (e
2
n + 1)
3 (C8)
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with

  2a2b (3  b) + a (b+ 1)  b2   4b  1  (b  1)  b2   4b  1 (C9)
where a  en=ef ; b  e2n: Note that b < 52 + 32
p
5 by (A5).
The sign of the RHS of (C8) is the sign of 
 which is quadratic in a with a maximum
(minimum) for b > (<)3: The highest value of 
 is then at @
=@a = 0 for b > 3 (if this
is an internal maximum) and at either the highest or lowest value of a for b  3. The
highest value of a is 1, for which 
 =  2(b + 1) < 0: The lowest value for a is where
dF nfh =den = 0 from (25): Substituting this into (C9), we nd 
 =  2a2b (b+ 1) < 0:
For b > 3; the maximum value of 
 in (C9) occurs at:
a = a  (b+ 1) (b
2   4b  1)
4b(b  3)
Substituting this into (C9), the highest possible value of 
 is:

 =
 
b2   4b  1  b4   10b3 + 24b2   30b  1
We see that a > 0 and 
 < 0 for b 2  3; 2 +p5 and a < 0 and 
 > 0
for b 2  2 +p5; 5
2
+ 3
2
p
5

: Thus, for all values of b for which there is potentially an
interior maximum (a > 0), 
 is negative. We conclude that 
 is negative so that the
RHS of (C8) is negative. The lowest possible value of (W nf  F nfh ) is thus achieved at
the maximum value of en; which is ef : Setting en = ef in (C7), we nd from (C1):
W nf  Rnfh 
1
2
 
e2f + 1
  Kn > 1
2 (e2h + 1)
 Kh = W h0
The inequality follows from (4) and ef < eh:
We will now prove Proposition 1 by examining each possible combination of R&D
decisions in turn.16
C.1.1 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W hd: With trade, welfare is W fh: By Lemma 1, W fh > W hd:
C.1.2 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W hd: With trade, welfare is W nh if the foreign rms R&D is
successful and W fh if it is not. By Lemma 1, W jh > W hd; j = n; f:
16The expressions for welfare are (C1), (C2) and (C3). To avoid repetition, we will omit references
to these equations in the following analysis.
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C.1.3 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare isW hd:With trade, welfare isW nn Ch = W nf Ch if the domestic
rms R&D is successful and W jh  R; j = f; n; if it is not. Thus we have:17
WRR  WN = phW nf +  1  phW jh  W hd   Ch >
> ph

W nf  Rnfh  W hd

+
 
1  ph W jh  W hd > 0
The rst inequality follows from Ch < Ch2 in (R&D, R&D), with C
h
2 given by (36).
The second inequality follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
C.1.4 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare isW nd Ch if R&D by the domestic rm is successful andW hd Ch
if it is not. With trade, welfare is W fh: Thus:
WNN  WR = W fh   phW nd    1  phW hd + Ch
Solving for ph, we see that expected welfare under free trade is higher than under
autarky if and only if inequality (40) holds.
C.1.5 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare isW nd Ch if R&D by the domestic rm is successful andW hd Ch
if it is not. With trade, welfare is W nh if the foreign rms R&D is successful and W fh
if it is not. Thus:
WNR  WR = pfW nh +  1  pfW fh   phW nd +  1  phW hd+ Ch
The RHS is positive if and only if (43) holds.
C.1.6 R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare isW nd Ch if R&D by the domestic rm is successful andW hd Ch
if it is not. With trade, welfare is W nf  Ch = W nn  Ch = W nd  Ch if the domestic
rms R&D is successful and W jh   Ch; j = f; n; if it is not. Thus we have:
WRR  WR = (1  p) W jh  W hd > 0
The inequality follows from Lemma 1.
17WXY and WX denote expected welfare under trade and autarky, respectively, with X (Y ) the
R&D choice of the domestic (foreign) rm. X;Y = R;N where R (N) means (no) R&D. The same
notation is used for D in Section C.2.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us rst collect the expressions for emissions. Emissions in each scenario are given
by e1q1: Thus in scenario id; i = h; n; we have from (19):
Eid =
ei
e2i + 1
(C10)
In scenarios nf and nn; emissions are, from (23):
Enf = Enn =
en
e2n + 1
(C11)
In scenario jh; j = f; n; emissions are, from (29):
Ejh =
ej
 
ejeh + e
2
j   e2h

e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
(C12)
Before turning to the Proposition, we rst establish:
Lemma 3 When the domestic rm has not found the new technology, emissions are
higher with free trade than under autarky: Ejh > Ehd with j = f; n:
Proof. From (C10) and (C12) it is clear that Ejh = Ehd for ej = eh: From (C12):
dEjh
dej
=
 e6j   2e5jeh + 3e4je2h + 3e4j   3e2je2h   4eje3h + 2e4h 
e4j + 3e
2
j   2e2h
2
Setting ej = eh yields:
dEjh
dej

ej=eh
=
 2e4h
(e4h + e
2
h)
2 < 0
Thus, when reducing ej below eh; Ejh initially rises above Ehd: However, for lower
values of ej, Ejh may decline again.
Dening a  ej=eh; b  e2h; we can write (C12) as:
Ejh =
ej(a
2 + a  1)
ba4 + 3a2   2
so that
Ejh   Ehd = eh

(a3 + a2   a)
ba4 + 3a2   2  
1
b+ 1

=
eh (a
2   1) (a  a2b+ ab  2)
(b+ 1) (ba4 + 3a2   2)
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The (potentially) positive solutions for Ejh = Ehd are ej = eh and
a =
1 + bpb2   6b+ 1
2
(C13)
There are only real solutions for a when b2   6b + 1  0; which is satised for
b  3   2p2 and b  3 + 2p2: The rst inequality is irrelevant by (18). In case the
second inequality holds, the highest possible value for a is for the maximum value of b
given by (A5), combined with the "+" sign on the RHS of (C13), so that:
a =
1
3
p
5 + 5
0@3
2
p
5 +
7
2
+
s
3
2
p
5 +
5
2
2
  9
p
5  14
1A t 0:61834 (C14)
Note that (28) can be written as ba3 + a   2 > 0: Substituting a from (C14) and
b = 5
2
+ 3
2
p
5 from (A5), we nd ba3+a 2 = 0; so that (28) is violated. Thus Ejh = Ehd
cannot hold and pollution is higher with trade than under autarky.
We will now prove Proposition 2 by examining each possible combination of R&D
decisions in turn.18
C.2.1 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Ehd. With trade, emissions are Efh: By Lemma 3, Efh > Ehd:
C.2.2 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Ehd. With trade, emissions are Enh if the foreign rms R&D
is successful and Efh if it is not. By Lemma 3, Ejh > Ehd; j = n; f:
C.2.3 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Ehd. With trade, emissions are Enn = Enf if the domestic
rms R&D is successful and Ejh; j = f; n; if it is not. We know from subsection C.2.2
that Enn = Enf > Ehd and from Lemma 3 that Ejh > Ehd with j = f; n:
18The expressions for emissions are (C10), (C11) and (C12). To avoid repetition, we will omit
references to these equations in the following analysis.
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C.2.4 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are End if R&D is successful and Ehd if it is not. With trade,
emissions are Efh with j = f: Thus:
DNN  DR = 1
2
(Efh)2   1
2

h
ph
 
End
2
+
 
1  ph  Ehd2i
Solving for ph; we see that the expected pollution damage under free trade is greater
than under autarky if and only if (42) holds.
C.2.5 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are End if R&D is successful and Ehd if it is not. With trade,
emissions are Enh if the foreign rms R&D is successful and Efh if it is not. Thus we
have:
DNR  DR = 1
2

h
pf (Enh)2 + (1  pf )  Efh2   ph  End2   (1  ph)(Ehd)2i =
1
2

h
ph
h
(Enh)2    End2i+ (1  pf ) h Efh2   (Ehd)2i+ (pf   ph) (Enh)2   (Ehd)2i
By Lemma 3, a su¢ cient condition for DNR > DR is (41).
C.2.6 R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are End if R&D is successful and Ehd if it is not. With trade,
emissions are Enn = Enf = End if the domestic rms R&D is successful and Ejh; j =
f; n; if it is not. Thus we have:
DRR  DR =
1
2

h
ph
 
End
2
+ pf
 
1  ph  Enh2 +  1  ph (1  pf )  Efh2   ph  End2    1  ph  Ehd2i
=
1
2
(1  ph)
h
pf
 
Enh
2
+
 
1  pf  Efh2    Ehd2i > 0
The inequality follows from Lemma 3.
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